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The Impact of Austerity on the  
Irish Social Protection System
Fiona duKelow
mairéad Considine
University College Cork, Ireland
This article analyzes the impact of austerity on the Irish social 
protection system. The analysis is situated in Ireland’s wider fi-
nancial and economic crisis and its status as an ‘early adopter’ 
of an austerity response which has continued under European 
Union/International Monetary Fund intervention. We focus on 
how the crisis instigated a political narrative about the cost and 
design of the social protection system, leading to a programme of 
retrenchment and reform which has blended a politics of blame 
avoidance with credit claiming. Three core elements in this nar-
rative—generosity, sustainability and suitability— are identi-
fied, and against this background, a pattern of multi-dimension-
al change in social protection across the life course dealing with 
working age, pensions, and child income supports is analyzed. 
Key words: Ireland, social protection policy, austerity, retrench-
ment, welfare
In the decade of unprecedented growth preceding Ireland’s 
current crisis, debates about its economic and social policy 
path were frequently framed in terms of ‘Boston versus Berlin.’ 
This dichotomy was articulated by a former prominent politi-
cian who proffered the view that “[w]e in Ireland have tended 
to steer a course between the two but I think it is fair to say that 
we have sailed closer to the American shore than the European 
one” (Harney, 2000). Such ideas inevitably simplify complex 
political and socio-economic realities, however the economic 
policy trajectory closely followed the liberal market model, and 
in the era of financialized capitalism Ireland became ‘a world 
leader in the financialization of the economy’ (Ó Riain, 2012, 
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p. 498). Yet in social policy terms, while typically linked with 
the liberal welfare regime, the range of influences on Ireland’s 
welfare development has meant that its position as a liberal 
welfare state is open to some ambiguity. It has been observed 
that it ‘defies classification’ and is better described as a ‘hybrid 
regime,’ with links in particular to the welfare tradition of the 
conservative/corporatist regime (Cousins, 1997; NESC, 2005). 
Moreover, many (e.g., Daly & Yeates, 2003; Murphy, 2012) 
noted that Irish social policy developments since the 1990s 
steered a different path to those of the UK, the more prototypi-
cal liberal welfare regime in Europe. 
Ireland’s economic crisis emerged as one of the most severe 
cases following the global financial crisis and the subsequent 
Eurozone crisis. It was primarily driven by an internally gener-
ated collapse of what Hay and Wincott (2012) term the "Anglo 
liberal growth model" manifest in the bursting of its property 
and credit bubbles, which had ruinous consequences for the 
Irish financial system and which were ultimately absorbed by 
the state. Ireland’s rapid turn to austerity, in which it was a 
forerunner of a wider European turn to austerity, has leant it 
exemplary status in debates about austerity versus stimulus. 
On the Keynesian side, it confirms the ‘fantasy of austerity’ by 
its continued poor economic performance (Krugman, 2012a, 
2012b). For neoliberals, minor signs of economic improvement 
are taken to indicate expansionary fiscal contraction, a theory 
that suggests public spending cuts encourage private expen-
diture and capital investment (Adam Smith Institute, 2011). 
Within the EU, the Irish case has been elevated as evidence 
"that the programmes can work" (Barroso, cited in Mackintosh, 
2013) and that EU/IMF loan conditions based on ‘fiscal consol-
idation’ have been the correct response to the Eurozone crisis. 
In economic terms, Ireland’s crisis response marks the contin-
ued influence of its existing neoliberal paradigm (Allen, 2012; 
Hay & Smith, 2013). In this regard, the Irish case tracks the ‘arc 
of neoliberalism’ (Centeno & Cohen, 2012) that remains domi-
nant, the European expression of which Fitoussi and Saraceno 
(2012) identify as the ‘Berlin-Washington’ consensus. As such, 
it appears the so-called ‘Boston versus Berlin’ dichotomy has 
presently collapsed into no alternative but the former. 
Our focus is to analyze what this ‘no alternative to aus-
terity’ approach has meant for Irish social protection policy, 
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identifying it as a key site of Ireland’s austerity politics. The 
article, based on qualitative analysis of crisis-centered politi-
cal debate and policy change, proceeds as follows. We set a 
context by outlining the nature of political debate about the 
crisis, attaching particular significance to how it implicated 
the cost and design of social protection in both the causes of 
and solutions to the crisis. We identify three core intertwined 
elements in this narrative—the generosity, sustainability and 
suitability of the social protection system. Against this back-
drop, changes to social protection policy are analyzed across 
three areas: working age, pensions and child income sup-
ports. Drawing on welfare retrenchment and welfare state 
change literature and related distinctions between cost-cutting 
and structural reform, we examine the types and degrees of 
change being implemented, finding that the dominant pattern 
of retrenchment is interacting with other crisis-led structural 
changes, and the majority of the structural changes are leading 
to further curtailment of the social protection system. 
Austerity Politics and the Social Protection System 
In contrast to early responses to the crisis inspired by 
Keynesianism (Hemerijck, 2012; Pontusson & Raess, 2012) and 
forms of fiscal stimulus in evidence across the Eurozone until 
early 2010, Ireland’s austerity program was already well ad-
vanced. Any scope for maneuvering in Ireland was expend-
ed on its response to its banking crisis. In autumn 2008, the 
government guaranteed almost all the liabilities of Ireland’s 
domestic banks, exposing the state to private debts worth ap-
proximately 275% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This con-
trasted with more limited guarantees subsequently implement-
ed elsewhere, and when combined with related bank rescue 
measures, Ireland’s policy response ranked as "the costliest 
banking crisis in advanced economies since at least the Great 
Depression" (Laeven & Valencia, 2012, p. 20). Ireland’s eco-
nomic contraction, which saw GDP decline by 12.4% between 
2007 and 2010, together with its reaction to the banking crisis, 
led to severe fiscal problems. The general government deficit 
grew from a surplus of 0.1% of GDP in 2007 to 13.4% of GDP 
in 2011, and general government gross debt rose from 25.1% 
to 106.4% of GDP over the same period (Eurostat, 2013). A 
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concern around the banking crisis was the speed and scale of 
the turn to austerity. Between 2008 and 2010, fiscal adjustments 
of almost 9% of GDP were implemented. By the time of the 
loan agreement with the EU/IMF in late 2010, when Ireland’s 
banking costs were overwhelming the state, the conditions at-
tached represented a continuation of many steps already taken 
with regard to fiscal policy and welfare retrenchment, and a 
further adjustment of 9% of GDP was agreed upon for 2011-
2013. Over both phases expenditure cuts have comprised ap-
proximately two thirds of the adjustments. 
Whereas internationally the Irish case became something 
of a brickbat in the debate between austerity and stimulus, na-
tionally this debate was strongly one-sided. The main political 
parties all accepted the need for austerity and the wider debt 
and deficit parameters of the EU Stability and Growth Pact. In 
making the case for investment and alternatives to austerity, 
the weak power resources of actors on the left, a long standing 
hallmark of Irish politics, meant it failed to make much impact 
on the hegemony of ‘there is no alternative.’ Pierson’s (1994) 
still influential theory of welfare retrenchment suggests that 
it is an unpopular and risky move for governments to pursue 
and that tactics of blame avoidance are typically utilized in 
the process. However, our focus examines how welfare ex-
penditure was framed in the crisis, not necessarily always in 
an unequivocally blame-avoidant manner, but in ways which 
blended with credit-claiming for being fiscally responsible. As 
Bonoli (2012) notes, this is one of a limited number of ways in 
which welfare retrenchment can become the object of a credit-
claiming strategy. Ireland’s weak left, together with the popu-
list tradition in Irish politics dominated by two main parties, 
Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael (both of which have operated under 
opaque ideological divisions), may provide conditions com-
patible with a credit-claiming logic in conditions of crisis. In 
particular, lack of robust ideological debate in political dis-
course affords latitude in the simultaneous adoption of ‘jus-
tification strategies’ (Green-Pedersen, 2002) that may seek to 
avoid blame or claim credit, depending on the policy context.
While Ireland’s crisis has multiple dimensions, a core 
element of political debate and interpretation has been framing 
the crisis as a debt crisis. This had the effect of opening up gov-
ernment expenditure and the policy choices made prior to the 
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crisis as objects of critique. In the words of former Taoiseach 
(Head of Government) Brian Cowen:  
As a society, we became over-optimistic about our 
recent, seemingly spectacular, economic success, and 
badly overshot the mark. People became impatient 
with restraint. …The general attitude was that we could 
afford to ramp up spending, while simultaneously 
being a low tax country, as if there were few hard 
choices to be made. (2010)
Strategies of welfare retrenchment became inextrica-
bly linked with prudent economic management, both by the 
Fianna Fáil/Green Party government in power when the crisis 
emerged, and by its replacement in 2011 by a Fine Gael/Labour 
Party coalition. 
In contrast with Pierson’s (2001) depiction of welfare states 
entering an era of permanent austerity, the Irish welfare state 
is often cast as a case of delayed development and appeared to 
encounter a delayed golden age prior to the crisis. Economic 
growth of the late 1990s and early 2000s provided unprec-
edented resources at governments’ disposal, thus enabling 
increased welfare expenditure. At the same time, taxes and 
social insurance contributions were reduced without fiscal re-
percussions. Social protection expenditure as a proportion of 
GDP remained relatively stable (6.7% of GDP in 2001 and 7.7% 
of GDP in 2007) and on the low side of European expenditure 
patterns. Moreover, an analysis of social expenditure from 1981 
to 2007 (McCashin, 2012) demonstrates how it was subject to 
a range of trends. It was clearly expansionary in the case of 
Child Benefits and retrenched in the case of Sickness Benefits, 
while extension of coverage was the overriding driver of in-
creased expenditure in other programs, such as pensions and 
unemployment. 
In keeping with the framing of the crisis as a crisis of public 
expenditure, ‘generosity’ became a new term in the semantic 
field of social protection. Political debate about the generosity 
of the system emerged as a justification for its retrenchment, 
especially in the early stages of the crisis. The idea was ampli-
fied with discussion of what became framed as the problem 
of the generosity of social protection. Government references 
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to generosity ranged between drawing attention to the gener-
osity of the system as pre-emptive defense of critique against 
cuts being implemented, to a ‘vice into virtue’ strategy (Levy, 
1999) claiming that cuts would actually preserve the generos-
ity of the system. In the latter case, rate cuts were justified as 
preventive action against more catastrophic cuts if measures to 
achieve fiscal stability were not undertaken. The first of two ex-
tensive cuts to payment rates were therefore claimed as action 
to "safeguard the generous system we have" (Lenihan, 2009). 
The issue of generosity was closely aligned to debates 
about sustainability and the need to reach a sustainable 
pattern of social expenditure. Sustainability encompassed the 
broad fiscal policy landscape, which was deeply impacted by 
a collapse in consumption/transaction dependent tax revenue 
as the credit and housing bubbles burst. Consequently, tax 
revenue fell by 33% between 2007 and 2010. Political debate 
drew on a cluster of ideas associated with the notion of fiscal 
responsibility and fiscal sustainability. Emphasis was placed 
on adjusting expenditure to sustainable levels, which directly 
implicated the social protection system, one of the largest areas 
of current expenditure. Again, a blame avoidance strategy was 
utilized, citing market pressure as a form of political cover 
with respect to why cutting expenditure was the only cred-
ible option. The confluence of retrenchment with sustainabil-
ity also became part of a credit-claiming strategy. This again 
drew on the idea of retrenchment as necessary safeguarding 
of the social protection system and the vulnerable. A similar 
diagnosis of the unsustainability of social expenditure remains 
central, with the current Minister for Public Expenditure and 
Reform, Brendan Howlin (2012) asserting, for example, that 
"our current levels of expenditure are no more sustainable than 
the property bubble that once sustained them." 
Concerns about the suitability of the focus and design of 
the social protection system in the context of unemployment 
(4.5% in 2007 to 14.8% by 2012) and the needs of the economy 
came more to the fore as the crisis continued. However, as-
sociated debates about structural reform have not been alto-
gether separate from the issue of generosity and cost contain-
ment. The relationship between social protection and the labor 
market, and specifically activation policy, became the object of 
greater scrutiny, because, as Fitzgerald (2012) puts it, "when 
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money was abundant, such structural change in programmes 
was generally off the agenda" (p. 1372). The crisis, therefore, 
stimulated a debate that potentially indicates a catch-up with 
more substantive adaptation that has taken place elsewhere, 
variously labeled as the emergence of the ‘new welfare state’ 
(Bonoli & Natali, 2012) and the ‘social investment welfare 
state’ (Morel, Palier, & Palme, 2012). The reform agenda of in-
tegrating the social protection system with labor market ser-
vices was further driven by conditions imposed by the EU/
IMF. Initial debate revolved around the issue of disincentive 
effects. This was articulated in ideas about the social protec-
tion system being "out of step with labor costs in the rest of 
the economy" (Lenihan, 2009), and the need to keep the un-
employed "as close to the labor market as possible" (Cowen, 
2010). More explicit reference to re-orienting social protection 
has occurred under the current government, which has tended 
to use a ‘vice into virtue’ strategy of claiming to transform 
the moribund legacy of a "passive welfare state to an active 
welfare state" (Burton, 2012). 
The remainder of the article looks at how these framing 
ideas have influenced crisis-led change in social protection. 
Although we have suggested that the Irish politics of austerity 
has not solely been about blame avoidance, Pierson’s (2001) 
conceptual distinction between cost-containment, re-com-
modification and recalibration is useful to deploy in looking at 
how ideas about generosity, sustainability and suitability have 
translated into policy change. Changes have therefore spanned 
from high visibility cost cutting to re-structuring, though the 
latter can be difficult to disentangle from the former. As an ad-
dendum to this, and to the concept of recalibration in particu-
lar, debates about the new welfare state and ‘new social poli-
cies’ have drawn attention to how retrenchment-led change is 
not only about cutting back existing social protection, but also 
about introducing new forms of provision and intervention. 
In this sense, an era of austerity can have multi-dimensional 
effects; Häusermann (2012) observes that change can simulta-
neously involve expansion of activation (flexicurity), re-alloca-
tion of spending from more generous to means-tested provi-
sion (welfare re-adjustment), and in some cases, preservation 
of existing provision (welfare protectionism). 
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Irish Social Protection
The Irish social protection system has traditionally been 
primarily oriented towards the goal of poverty alleviation as 
opposed to income replacement. It comprises social insurance 
payments and a corresponding set of social assistance pay-
ments covering various contingencies such as unemployment, 
illness and disability, caring, one-parent families, and pensions. 
Social insurance is based on pay-related contributions and flat 
rate payments, and for most working age payments, there is no 
differential between the value of a social insurance payment 
and its corresponding social assistance payment, whereas 
for pensions the differential is 10%. The state (contributory) 
pension payment is approximately 34% of average earnings 
which is a comparatively low replacement rate (Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2011). 
Replacement rates for unemployment payments also tend to 
fall below the OECD average (NERI, 2012). Family and child-
related income supports comprise a universal Child Benefit 
(CB) payment with additional means-tested payments target-
ed at low income families. 
The Irish social protection system stands out for having 
a significant proportion of means-tested payments, typi-
cally ranking highest on this indicator in the EU. In 2008 for 
example, 25.2% of all payments were means-tested compared 
to 11.1% for EU27 (Eurostat, 2012). Overall, therefore, the 
Irish social protection system tends to "modify tendencies to 
extreme inequalities rather than attempting substantial redis-
tribution or universal social provision" (McCashin & O’Shea, 
2007, p. 274). In the period prior to the crisis, this orientation 
was manifest in poverty rates which remained above the EU 
average, reflecting the fact that while payment rates grew, 
they remained low relative to average incomes. The poverty 
reduction effects of welfare payments did improve by the mid-
2000s when social protection rates were raised ahead of wage 
growth rates, and the risk of poverty rate converged with the 
EU average. However, the impact of subsequent recession and 
welfare retrenchment is evidenced in increases in at-risk-of-
poverty rates (16% in 2011) and a sharp rise in the deprivation 
rate, which has more than doubled since 2007 (24.5% in 2011). 
Children remain the age cohort at highest risk of both poverty 
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(18.8%) and deprivation (32.1%), and the at-risk-of-poverty 
rate for unemployed people (30.6%) is also particularly high 
(CSO, 2013). Against this backdrop, the role and impact of the 
social protection system and its reform remains central. 
Working Age Social Protection
Under the justificatory strategy of a generous system, out-
right cost cutting has formed a large part of the retrenchment 
measures implemented. Rate cuts were applied to all working 
age payments in Budgets 2010 and 2011. These cuts, together 
with the abolition of an extra payment at Christmas, represent 
a cumulative reduction of 10%. Despite comprehensive rate 
cuts being a highly visible form of cost containment, relatively 
little mobilization against them and against austerity more 
broadly, took place. Pierson’s (2001) observation about the 
institutional design of liberal welfare systems may be appli-
cable, in that systems which have a high means-tested compo-
nent militate against strong popular support for welfare. More 
severe rate cuts have been applied to certain social assistance 
payments. A 51% reduction to Jobseeker’s Allowance (JA) for 
claimants aged 18 and 19 in 2009 was extended to claimants 
aged 18-21 in 2010, with a 30% cut applied to those aged 22-24. 
In addition, a 30% rate reduction sanction was introduced 
where claimants refuse activation. Such change points to the 
cross-cutting agendas of activation and cost-containment, as 
well as the ambiguity of activation and ideas such as ‘making 
work pay,’ which can emphasize ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’ (Kuhner, 
2012).  
Substantial re-commodification, a relatively more obfus-
cating strategy than rate cuts, is also being undertaken. This 
is particularly evident in the case of Jobseekers Benefit (JB), as 
qualifying conditions for social insurance payments were tight-
ened and the duration of entitlement substantially reduced. 
The number of contributions required to qualify doubled, and 
the duration of entitlement has been significantly curtailed. 
Other forms of re-commodification concern the complex rules 
of entitlement and qualifying conditions which vary across 
the contingency-based system. They include restrictions to 
entitlements to concurrent payments; changes to income dis-
regards where claimants may work but continue to qualify 
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for a payment; stricter means-testing; expanding taxable 
payments; reductions to qualifying adult payments, rent sup-
plement and other additional allowances. The One Parent 
Family Payment has undergone the most significant change in 
this regard, stemming from reform ideas first broached in 2006 
but substantially stalled until the crisis occurred. Eligibility is 
now also being based on the age of the parent's youngest child, 
which is being reduced on a phased basis (from 18 years in 
2011 to 7 years for all claimants by 2015). 
Although Irish activation expenditure has been highlight-
ed as being relatively high in comparative terms, the crisis 
has brought the system into sharper focus and opened up 
the possibility of substantial recalibration. Activation policy 
has been criticized for being "fragmented and lacking ambi-
tion," having a "passive and low-intensity" approach, and 
lagging behind developments elsewhere (NESC, 2011, p. xv). 
Given Ireland’s conservative and incremental culture of policy 
making (Kirby & Murphy, 2011), the crisis and the influence of 
transnational policy actors has stimulated significant institu-
tional reform. Responsibility for activation services has moved 
to the Department of Social Protection, and a new agency, the 
National Employment and Entitlements Service, is being es-
tablished. At the local level, the integration of social protec-
tion and activation services is being introduced under a single 
new service, Intreo. Modeled on the UK system, the changes 
entail a more individualized case management approach than 
heretofore, including profiling techniques to tailor interven-
tions based on claimant’s employability and risk of long-term 
unemployment. Active labor market programs are also being 
reformed, to include greater flexibility of qualifying conditions 
to some, the introduction of some new schemes and the re-
trenchment of more ‘passive’ programs. In all, however, the 
scale of provision falls far short of the scale of the unemploy-
ment crisis.
More far-reaching recalibration was signaled by a report 
which examined the feasibility of introducing a single social 
assistance payment for people of working age (Department of 
Social Protection, 2010). It proposed a single payment with dif-
ferent levels of conditionality and support, depending on the 
distance of the claimant from the labor market. Payment levels, 
modeled on JA rates and rules, would represent a rate cut for 
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claimants of other schemes, though it is not clear at present 
whether such radical reform will progress. 
Pension System Reform
Pension system reform has been on the policy agenda for 
the last two decades, and has been marked by a series of in-
cremental but limited reforms to incentivize supplementary 
pension arrangements, whilst simultaneously attempting 
cost containment and addressing inadequacies in state provi-
sion. The most recent policy statement, the National Pensions 
Framework (NPF) (Government of Ireland, 2010a), places 
particular emphasis on affordability and long-term system 
sustainability. The core policy principles applied to first-tier 
pensions appear largely unchanged, as "the State Pension will 
continue to be the fundamental basis for the pension system" 
(Government of Ireland, 2010a, p. 14). In fact, the stated 35% 
replacement target rate represents an improvement on previ-
ous policy ambition. Payment rates increased during the pre-
crisis period, before being frozen in 2009 when state pensions 
were the only payments not to be cut in the retrenchment that 
followed. This treatment could be read as welfare protection-
ism, in which privileges of existing beneficiaries have been 
shielded against demands associated with newer/other risk 
groups. However, it needs to be considered in conjunction 
with simultaneous welfare re-adjustment measures introduced 
with respect to social insurance eligibility requirements. The 
proposal to move to a total contributions approach by 2020, 
and the increase in the state pension qualification age from age 
65 to 66 in 2014, to 67 in 2021 and to 68 in 2028, a comparatively 
shorter timeframe than in most other European welfare states, 
indicates the scale of the change (Considine, 2012). 
In terms of second-tier pensions, the introduction of per-
sonal retirement savings accounts (PRSAs) in the early 2000s 
marked an effort at re-commodification which sought to make 
private pension arrangements more accessible. However, 
PRSAs did not have a significant impact and the NPF propos-
es that a system of auto-enrolment be introduced to increase 
supplementary coverage. This measure is proposed for 2014, 
although its introduction remains contingent on a general 
improvement in macro-economic conditions. This potential 
change could be interpreted as path departure in terms of 
Austerity and the Irish Social Protection System 65
obligation to contribute to a second-tier pension, although 
given the longstanding policy to incentivize individual/occu-
pational provision through pension tax benefits; it is simulta-
neously a policy instrument which gives preference to a sig-
nificant pre-existing element of provision, with enforcement to 
broaden coverage. It may therefore be considered a structural 
change that is potentially significant in terms of the role and 
reach of quasi-mandatory second-tier provision. However, 
the existing duality in the system, where half of the work-
force already broadly conforms to this policy objective, and 
the limited reform of core tax benefit arrangements, points to a 
limited redirection of pension policy preferences to date. High 
income earners remain much more likely to have supplemen-
tary pensions, make higher contributions and benefit from tax 
relief, while lower earners are less likely to benefit from this 
tax expenditure at all. Pension tax benefits were set to be sub-
stantially overhauled and made more equitable (Government 
of Ireland, 2010a, 2010b). Measures introduced over recent 
Finance Acts limit generous tax benefits to the highest income 
earners, although the mainframe of the tax benefit structure 
(delivered at standard and marginal rates of tax) remain un-
changed. Budget 2013 maintains the status quo in this regard, 
with focus centered on limiting tax relief to pensions that 
accrue an income of over €60,000 per annum. 
Finally, the Irish variant of the multi-pillar system, and in 
particular the reliance on the market for the provision of ad-
equate retirement income replacement and the risks to which 
they are exposed, has been brought into sharper focus by the fi-
nancial crisis, as Irish pension losses were second only to those 
of the U.S. in 2008 (Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, 2011). Approximately 70% of defined benefit 
schemes in Ireland are in actuarial deficit (Pensions Board, 
2012), contribution levels to many private pensions are widely 
regarded as insufficient, and there is a lack of transparency/
clarity around charges applied and the impact of pension fund 
losses more generally (Stewart, 2011). It is against this wider 
backdrop that current Irish pension system reform needs to 
be examined; existing patterns of dualization may be altered, 
but the direction that will take depends on which elements 
of the reform agenda are prioritized and the manner of their 
implementation. 
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Child Income Supports
Child Income Supports (CIS) evolved in an ad hoc and frag-
mented way over an extended period; these were designed to 
meet a range of policy objectives, from alleviating poverty to a 
state recognition of the costs associated with raising children. 
The system comprises a mix of targeted and universal provi-
sions, which underwent significant expansion in 2006 with the 
introduction of an Early Childcare Supplement (ECS), paid in 
respect of all children age 0-6 years to offset childcare costs. 
This payment represented a typically liberal cash-based re-
sponse to the cost of childcare issue. However, the ECS was one 
of the first welfare payments to be abolished as retrenchment 
took effect. It was replaced in 2010 with the Early Childhood 
Care and Education (ECCE) scheme, an illustration of welfare 
recalibration with an unprecedentedly rapid shift from cash 
assistance to universal social service delivery. Whatever the 
shortcomings of the ECCE scheme, its introduction at a time 
of austerity represents a noteworthy policy departure that 
engaged simultaneously in rationalizing and updating to ac-
commodate wider policy goals in relation to the care and edu-
cation of young children.
There has been considerable retrenchment of other ele-
ments of CIS since 2008. CB was noted for its cost containment 
potential and was cut in successive budgets. Eligibility criteria 
were also restricted, with payments no longer made in respect 
of 18-year-olds still in education. CB rates have been cut by 
almost 22% for the first two children, with higher reductions in 
respect to subsequent children. Some compensatory measures 
were instituted initially through Qualified Child Increases 
and Family Income Supplement to protect low income fami-
lies, although such measures were not applied in more recent 
Budgets, and some other targeted payments were also reduced. 
Pointing to the rapid increases in the cost of CB, which 
saw the payment rate treble between 2000 and 2007, the need 
for a more efficient and targeted approach is regularly es-
poused. Broadly speaking, this efficiency/equity argument 
divides between preferences to tax CB and/or the removal 
of its universal basis in favor of targeted means-tested 
provision. A report on child and family income support 
(Advisory Group on Tax and Social Welfare, 2012) advocates 
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the retention of a reduced universal payment and proposes a 
two-tier CIS payment comprising CB and an automatic sup-
plementary payment (to replace the existing ones) in respect 
of children whose parents are in receipt of a social assistance 
payment. Other parents (including those in receipt of social 
insurance payments) would be subject to application and 
income-test for the supplementary element of this income 
support, with a greater degree of means-testing one inevitable 
outcome of this reform.
No government decision has been made at the time of 
writing in respect to these CIS proposals, but the discussion 
points to a shift away from the old ‘logics of welfare reform’ 
(Häusermann, 2012) with a particular focus on welfare re-ad-
justment. Significant retrenchment of universal child income 
payments has been coupled with greater attention to the new 
logic of social investment and needs-based child income sup-
ports. Wider social service supports in relation to children and 
families matter to how this may develop, and consideration of 
the social investment approach is a relatively new departure 
in terms of the Irish welfare state. In this context, the relatively 
swift introduction of the ECCE scheme, even at the height of 
the economic crisis, may point to some shift in policy think-
ing that has social investment leanings. How far this extends, 
however, is a far more open question, as the retrenchment 
imposed through a series of rate cuts and changes to eligibil-
ity rules has simultaneously negatively affected the incomes of 
many families with children. 
Conclusion
In this article we have examined how the politics of auster-
ity in the Irish case have been framed by a number of salient 
ideas, in ways which blend blame avoidance with credit claim-
ing in how changes to the social protection system have been 
approached. We have located Ireland's policy choices within 
the wider contradictory neoliberal response to the economic 
crisis, from which the ‘no alternative to austerity,’ which si-
multaneously requires substantial state support of finan-
cial systems, has emanated. Turning to examine the impact 
of austerity on the social protection system, and drawing on 
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Pierson’s concepts of cost-containment, re-commodification 
and recalibration, it is clear that all three types of change are 
occurring. Substantial cost-containment and re-commodifi-
cation across programs for working age adults have blurred 
the already weak boundary between the benefits attached to 
social insurance and social assistance payments, while in the 
case of child income supports, universal payments are being 
retrenched in favor of targeted forms of support. These trends 
appear to accentuate the liberal characteristics of the social 
protection system. 
The crisis has also stimulated stronger recalibration, mani-
fest in new types of services and program design for working 
age adults and children. These are indicative of an effort to 
re-orient the norms upon which the social protection system 
has been built, from alleviating poverty by compensating for 
unemployment and other ‘old’ social risks, to supporting and 
incentivizing employment. In the crisis context, however, such 
recalibration has been subordinated to and limited by the goal 
of cost-containment, with the effect that rate cuts and sanctions 
have constituted a significant element of the emerging activa-
tion approach. It remains to be seen how individualized case 
management will evolve in this environment. 
The crisis added urgency to a long-standing reform agenda 
concerning pension sustainability and equity, yet wide ranging 
tax benefit reform proposed has been only partially implement-
ed, appearing to preserve existing inequities in the system. 
While the absence of rate cuts to state pensions demonstrates 
that welfare protectionism can occur even in severe crises, sub-
stantial re-commodification is in prospect for future claimants. 
Altogether, these changes are producing a complex, uneven 
picture of the impact of austerity on the Irish social protec-
tion system, the effects of which are still unfolding. However, 
the current reform agenda displays less system hybridity than 
heretofore, with Irish social protection moving towards more 
archetypal liberal welfare principles and patterns in the ways 
it is both being retrenched and recalibrated. 
Austerity and the Irish Social Protection System
References
Adam Smith Institute. (2011, September 27). Ireland has 99 problems, 
but austerity ain’t one. Retrieved from http://www.adamsmith.
org/blog/international/ireland-has-99-problems-but-austerity-
aint-one
Advisory Group on Tax and Social Welfare. (2012). Advisory Group on 
Tax and Social Welfare First Report: Child and Family Income Support.
Dublin: Department of Social Protection.
Allen, K. (2012). The model pupil who failed the test: Social policy in 
the Irish crisis. Critical Social Policy, 32(3), 422-439.
Bonoli, B. (2012). Blame avoidance and credit claiming revisited. In 
G. Bonoli & D. Natali, (Eds.), The politics of the new welfare state 
(pp. 93-110). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bonoli, G., & Natali, D. (Eds.). (2012). The politics of the new welfare 
state.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Burton, J. (2012). Social Welfare Bill 2012, Second Stage. Retrieved 
from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20
authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail2012121100055?open
document#CCC00100
Centeno, M., & Cohen, J. (2012). The arc of neoliberalism. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 38, 317-340.
Considine, M. (2012, September). Increasing the state pension 
qualification age, pension system reform and the impact of austerity: 
Ireland in context. Paper presented at the ESPAnet Conference 
2012, University of Edinburgh.
Cousins, M. (1997). Ireland’s place in the worlds of welfare capitalism. 
Journal of European Social Policy, 7(3) 223-235.
Cowen, B. (2010, 8 December). Speech by the Taoiseach, Mr. Brian Cowen 
TD on the 2011 Budget. Dáil Éireann. Retrieved from http://www.
taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Government_Press_Office/Taoiseach's 
Speeches 2010/Speech_by_the_Taoiseach_on_the_2011_Budget_
Dáil_Éireann_8_December_2010.html
CSO. (2013). Survey on income and living conditions (SILC) 2011 & 
revised 2010 results, 13 February 2013. Cork: CSO.
Daly, M., & Yeates, N., (2003). Common origins, different paths: 
Adaptation and change in social security in Britain and Ireland. 
Policy and Politics, 31(1), 85-97. 
Department of Social Protection (2010). Report on the desirability and 
feasibility of introducing a single social assistance payment for people of 
working age. Dublin: Department of Social Protection. 
Eurostat (2012). Social protection - social benefits by function. Retrieved 
from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/
index.php/Social_protection_-_social_benefits_by_function
Eurostat. (2013). Government finance statistics. Retrieved from http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_
finance_statistics/data/main_tables
70    Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Fitoussi, J. P., & Saraceno, F. (2012). European economic governance: The 
Berlin-Washington consensus. Paris: OFCE.
Fitzgerald, E. (2012). Rise and fall of the Irish economy – a social 
policy perspective. The World Economy. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9701.2012.01489.x
Government of Ireland (2010a). National pensions framework. Dublin: 
Stationery Office.
Government of Ireland (2010b). National recovery plan 2011-2014.
Dublin: Stationery Office.
Green-Pedersen, C. (2002). The politics of justification: Party competition 
and welfare-state retrenchment in Denmark and the Netherlands from 
1982 to 1998. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Harney, M. (2000). Remarks by Tánaiste, Mary Harney at a Meeting of 
the American Bar Association in the Law Society of Ireland, Blackhall 
Place, Dublin on Friday 21st July 2000. Department of Enterprise, 
Trade and Employment, Dublin. Retrieved from http://www.
entemp.ie/press/2000/210700.htm 
Häusermann, S. (2012). The politics of old and new social policies. 
In G. Bonoli & D. Natali (Eds.), The politics of the new welfare state 
(pp. 111-132). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hay, C., & Smith, N. (2013). The story of a North Sea bubble: The 
strange demise of the Angloliberal growth model in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland. European Political Science Review, 5(3), 401-
430. doi:10.1017/S1755773912000185
Hay, C., & Wincott, D. (2012). The political economy of European welfare 
capitalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hemerijck, A. (2012). Two or three waves of welfare state 
transformation? In N. Morel, B. Palier, & J. Palme (Eds.), Towards 
a social investment welfare state? (pp. 33-60). Bristol: The Policy 
Press.
Howlin, B. (2012). Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform Brendan 
Howlin, T.D. Address to Dáil Éireann on Expenditure Estimates 2013 
Wednesday 5th December, 2012. Retrieved from http://budget.gov.
ie/budgets/2013/EstimateStatement.aspx
Kirby, P., & Murphy, M. (2011). Towards a second republic: Irish politics 
after the Celtic Tiger. London: Pluto.
Krugman, P. (2012a). Austerity fantasies. New York Times, 30 
April 2012. Retrieved from http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.
com/2012/04/30/auster i ty-fantasies/?_php=true&_
type=blogs&_r=0
Krugman, P. (2012b). Meanwhile in the role model. New York Times, 
17 June 2012. Retrieved from http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.
com/2012/06/17/meanwhile-in-the-role-model/
Kuhner, S. (2012). Welfare retrenchment under left and right 
government leadership: Towards a consolidated framework of 
analysis? In M. Kilkey, G. Ramia, & K. Farnsworth (Eds.), Social 
policy review 24 (pp. 137-163). Bristol: The Policy Press.
Austerity and the Irish Social Protection System 71
Laeven, L., & Valencia, F. (2012). Systemic banking crises database: An 
update. IMF Working Paper WP/ 12/163. Washington: IMF.
Lenihan, B. (2009). Financial statement of the Minister for Finance Mr. 
Brian Lenihan, T.D. 9 December 2009. Retrieved from http://
www.budget.gov.ie/budgets/2010/FinancialStatement.aspx
Levy, J. (1999). Vice into virtue? Progressive politics and welfare 
reform in Continental Europe. Politics and Society, 27(2), 239-273.
Mackintosh, J. (2013). Ireland: Poster child for austerity. Financial Times. 
Retrieved from http://blogs.ft.com/ft-long-short/2013/03/04/
ireland-poster-child-for-austerity/
McCashin, A. (2012). Social security expenditures in Ireland, 1981–
2007: An analysis of welfare state change. Policy and Politics, 
40(4), 547-567.
McCashin, A., & O’Shea, J. (2007). The Irish welfare system. In K. 
Schubert, S. Hegelich, & U. Bazant (Eds.), The Handbook of 
European welfare systems (pp. 260-276). Oxon: Routledge. 
Morel, N., Palier, B., & Palme, J. (Eds.). (2012). Towards a social 
investment welfare state? Bristol: The Policy Press.
Murphy, M. (2012). Interests, institutions and ideas: Explaining Irish 
social security policy. Policy and Politics, 40(3), 347-365.
NERI. (2012). Quarterly economic facts Summer 2012. Dublin: NERI.
NESC. (2005). The developmental welfare state. Dublin: NESC. 
NESC. (2011). Supports and services for unemployed jobseekers. Dublin: 
NESC.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011). 
Pensions at a glance 2011: Retirement-income systems in OECD and 
G20 countries. OECD Publishing. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/pension_glance-2011-en
Ó Riain, S. (2012). The crisis of financialisation in Ireland. Economic 
and Social Review, 43(4), 497-533. 
Pensions Board. (2012). Annual report and accounts 2011. Dublin: 
Pensions Board.
Pierson, P. (1994). Dismantling the welfare state? Reagan, Thatcher, and 
the politics of retrenchment. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Pierson, P. (2001). Coping with permanent austerity welfare 
restructuring in affluent democracies. In P. Pierson (Ed.), The new 
politics of the welfare state (pp. 410-456). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Pontusson, J., & Raess, D. (2012). How (and why) is this time different? 
The politics of economic crisis in Western Europe and the United 
States. Annual Review of Political Science, 15, 13-33. 
Stewart, J. (2011). The Pension System in Ireland: Current issues and 
reform. TCD Pension Policy Research Group, Working Paper No. 
4. Dublin, TCD. Retrieved from http://www.tcd.ie/business/
assets/pdfs/The%20Pension%20System%20in%20Ireland%20
December%202011.pdf 
72    Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
